CHAP. V. An inquiry, what we may reasonably think to have been, at this time, the actual state of Adam's knowledge. * MOST writers, who have treated of the Fall, give us accounts of what they think was the primitive state of Adam and Eve's knowledge before they committed sin; but their sentiments, however ingenious they may seem, are no better than groundless imaginations. Our English poet represents Adam, when just created, not only as seeing things as they came before him; but instantly knowing their natures, by God's giving him an immediate apprehension of them. Introducing Adam relating how he named the creatures; supposing the hypothesis to have been fact, that God caused an assemblage of the whole animal world, to see what Adam would name every creature, he makes him say of himself, I nam'd them as they pass'd, and understood That God could, if he had pleased, have thus endowed Adam, can be no question; but that God did not, is plain; for nothing can be more evident, than that nei a Milton's Paradise Lost, b. viii. 352. ther Eve nor Adam had in fact this knowledge. They seem both to have been together when the serpent spake to Eve; but neither appears to have been surprised at hearing a serpent speak in man's voice. The observation which they seem to have made upon it was, that the serpent was more subtle than any beast of the field: they had heard no other creature thus speak, and therefore apprehended that the serpent had higher endowments than other animals. But we have no hint which represents either of them as having been at all aware that the serpent was not by nature as conversible as themselves; a plain indication, that they had no The supposing Eve to have gone forth to work separate from Adam on the morning that the temptation befel her, is an ingenious fiction of our poet; which gave him room to introduce an episode as beautiful, and well-ornamented in all its incidents, as human imagination could contrive or can conceive. See Milton's Paradise Lost, b. ix. But I do not see that the text of Moses appears to countenance it: Moses says, that Eve, לאישה עמה ויאכל גם ותתן ותאכל מפריו ותקח et edit secum viro etiam et dedit et edit de fructu ejus et cepit That she took of the fruit and did eat, and gave also to her husband, who was with her, and he did eat. c Gen. iii. 1. d Milton, b. ix. supposes that Eve had been much surprised at hearing the serpent speak; and represents her asking how he came by that ability; to which he answers, that he was raised to that attainment by eating the fruit of the forbidden tree; and that she hence argued, if the dumb animal was so heightened beyond f such knowledge of the animal world as Milton supposes. Milton variously imagines that Adam had this innate sudden apprehension to guide him aright to judge of all things; of the nature of God; and the nature of man; in a word, of every thing knowable, within the reach of the human capacity. In truth, this seems to be the general opinion of writers; who speak of Adam as if he was created a philosopher; had implanted in him a natural fund of all science, instantly informing him of the true nature of things, whenever any of them came before his eyes, or any occasion was given him to have thoughts of them in his mind. They think that he had innate sentiments of all moral duties; and that before the Fall he was ignorant of nothing but of sin but the history of Moses sets before us plain facts, flatly contradicting all these assertions. If Adam had a true and innate knowledge and apprehension of the nature of God; how could he have been so ignorant of him with whom he had to do, as to think that getting behind the cover of a few trees would hide him his natural abilities by eating of this fruit, then well might she and Adam hope to be as God, if they should eat of it. But, however agreeable this fiction is by the manner in which the poet has most elegantly painted it; yet it can only be an elegant fiction. Moses suggests nothing like it, nor is it likely that God would have permitted what might have given a more than ordinary appearance and strength to the temptation. See hereafter. Milton, b. viii. 357-413, &c. f Ibid. from his presence? or if he philosophically knew himself, had full and innate apprehensions of the use and light of his own reason, and of all that could come within the reach of it; what room could there be for the serpent frivolously to offer to open further, either his eyes or his understanding? Rationally judging, and having a right judgment of every thing that came before, either his outwad perception, or his inward reflection, the serpent's temptation must have appeared intuitively absurd. He would have felt himself not wanting such additions as the serpent suggested; and, besides, would have had a better thought of things, than to be capable of imagining, that the improvements proposed to him could arise from doing what the serpent recommended. We may therefore, if we will write at random, say high things of Adam and Eve's natural and philosophical knowledge; but we can never make it appear that they had as yet much science, if in fact they knew things no better than to think that a serpent might naturally be able to speak to them; or grossly to believe, that meat for the body might be food for the understanding; that the fruit of a tree which they saw growing in their garden, could be a thing to be desired to eat to make one wise. A sentiment this, not to be digested by any one that has understanding, and conse Gen. iii. S.-The reader will observe, that this was after Adam's Fall, when all his mental powers were debased by the introduction of sin. EDIT. h Gen. iii. 6. quently must demonstrate that our first parents had as yet attained but little advancement in real knowledge.' Adam, as soon as he received the breath of life, became a living soul: but he had a body made of the ground, and his soul was, as our souls are, shut up within the inclosure of this tabernacle. In this state, the things without him, the material objects of this world, could raise in him no ideas, but as sensations of them were conveyed by his outward senses.' He could naturally judge of what he thus perceived no farther than ἐκθυμηθῆναι ἀξίως τῶν διδομένων," to think of them suitably to what was given, or presented to him: and if he looked inward upon himself, he could form ideas of his own mind, only as he made trial of its capacity and powers, and thereby came to know them: so that experience only could give him naturally an increase of knowledge. Let us suppose him turning his thoughts from himself to a higher object; to consider Him who made him; "Say, of God above What could he reason, but from what he knew?"n He knew of God as yet no more, than what the words i Gen. ii. 7. k Ibid. This, I think, must be allowed as unquestionable. See Locke's Essay on Human Understanding, b. ii. c. 1; unless we could imagine that Adam had been a creature originally furnished with different abilities to perceive the things without him, other than the five operations or senses, which the author of Ecclesiasticus represents that he had been endued with as we are. Ecclus. xvii. 5. m Wisdom vii. 15. 0 Pope's Essay on Man, ep. 1. |