 ... we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the Mind, or Ego, is something different from any series of feelings, or possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox, that something which ex hypothesi is but a series of feelings, can be...  Proceedings - Sida 183efter Literary and Philosophical Society of Liverpool - 1897Obegränsad förhandsgranskning - Om den här boken
 | Hector Macpherson - 1907 - 354 sidor
...by calling it a Beries of feelings which is aware of itself as past and future ; and we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the mind or ego...them, or of accepting the paradox that something which ex hypothesi is but a series of feelings can be aware of itself as a series." Had Mill been familiar... | |
 | Frederick Converse Beach, George Edwin Rines - 1911 - 978 sidor
...ex hyfothcsi, is but a series of feelings, can be aware of itself as a series." He therefore admits that "the mind, or ego, is something different from...any series of feelings or possibilities of them." While, then, he holds to the doctrine of "circumstances" as determining character, he is careful to... | |
 | Frank Challice Constable - 1911 - 362 sidor
...like the first, may be expressed in the words of JS Mill, viz., " the alternative of believing that mind or ego is something different from any series of feelings or possibilities of them." To admit this, of course, is to admit the necessity of distinguishing between mind or ego, meaning... | |
 | James Seth - 1912 - 404 sidor
...feelings, or possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox, that something which ex hypotheii is but a series of feelings, can be aware of itself as a series. The truth is, that we are here face to face with that final inexplicability, at which, as Sir W. Hamilton... | |
 | Frank Thilly - 1914 - 1358 sidor
...by calling it a series of feelings which is aware of itself as past and future; and we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the mind, or...them, or of accepting the paradox that something which ex hypothesi is but a series of feelings, can be aware of itself as a series. ... I think by far the... | |
 | Clay MacCauley - 1914 - 866 sidor
...the possibilities of feeling." He has admitted tbat, in giving this definition, — " We are reduced to the alternative of believing that the mind, or...possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox that somethmg which ex hypotkesi is but a series of feelings can be aware of itself as a series." Mr. Mill... | |
 | Charles Harris - 1914 - 668 sidor
...by calling it a series of feelings which is aware of itself as past and future ; and we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the mind, or Ego, is something different from any scries of feelings or possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox that something which, ex hypothesi,... | |
 | Colin McAlpin - 1915 - 452 sidor
...alternative of believing that the mind, or ego, is something different from any series of feelings, or of accepting the paradox that something which is,...of feelings, can be aware of itself as a series." Or as Reid has it: — " A person is something indivisible, and is what Leibnitz calls a 'monad.' My... | |
 | Colin McAlpin - 1915 - 460 sidor
...speak of the mind as a series of feelings which is aware of itself as past and future, we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the mind, or...something different from any series of feelings, or of accepting the paradox that something which is, ex hypothesi, but a series of feelings, can be aware... | |
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