 ... we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the Mind, or Ego, is something different from any series of feelings, or possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox, that something which ex hypothesi is but a series of feelings, can be...  Proceedings - Sida 183efter Literary and Philosophical Society of Liverpool - 1897Obegränsad förhandsgranskning - Om den här boken
 | Edgar Sheffield Brightman - 1925 - 418 sidor
...by calling it a series of feelings which is aware of itself as past and future; and we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the mind, or...something different from any series of feelings, or of possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox, that something which ex hypothesi is but a series... | |
 | Svend Valdemar Rasmussen - 1925 - 186 sidor
...feelings, or possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox, that something which ex hypothesi is but a series of feelings, can be aware of itself as a series." 1 "There is a bond of some sort among all the parts of the series, which makes me say that they were... | |
 | Henry Wheeler Robinson - 1928 - 324 sidor
...by calling it a series of feelings which is aware of itself as past and future ; and we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the Mind, or...or of accepting the paradox, that something which ex hypothesi is but a series of feelings, can be aware of itself as a series."2 There must therefore... | |
 | Gail Kennedy - 1928 - 88 sidor
...feelings, or possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox, that something which ex hypothesi is but a series of feelings, can be aware of itself as a series." "The truth is, that we are face to face with that final inexplicability, .... that something which... | |
 | William Lonsdale Watkinson, William Theophilus Davison - 1882 - 584 sidor
...by " calling it a series of feelings aware of itself as past and future ; and (thus) we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the mind, or...or of accepting the paradox that something which, ex hypothesi, is but a series of feelings can be aware of itself as a series." f In other words, Mill... | |
 | Geoffrey Scarre - 1988 - 262 sidor
...193-94). Consequently, Mill concluded, we must either accept 'the paradox, that something which ... is but a series of feelings, can be aware of itself as a series,' or concede that 'the Mind, or Ego' is, after all, 'something different from any series of feelings,... | |
 | John Cunningham Wood - 1991 - 676 sidor
...by calling it a series of feelings which is aware of itself as past and future; and we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the Mind, or...or of accepting the paradox, that something which ex hypothesi is but a series of feelings, can be aware of itself as a series. The truth is, that we... | |
 | James Fitzjames Stephen - 1991 - 312 sidor
...by calling it a series of feelings which is aware of itself as past and future, and we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the Mind or Ego...possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox [I should have said of making the unmeaning and even contradictory assertion] that something which... | |
 | James Fitzjames Stephen - 1991 - 312 sidor
...said of making the unmeaning and even contradictory assertion] that something which ex hypothe» is but a series of feelings can be aware of itself as a series. The truth is, that we are here face to face with that final inexplicability at which, as Sir W. Hamilton... | |
 | John Skorupski - 1998 - 612 sidor
...which "is aware of itself as past and future". This involves the "paradox" that "something which ... is but a series of feelings, can be aware of itself as a series". The result, Mill believes, is fatal for his theory: we are here face to face with that final inexplicability,... | |
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