...background of possibilities of feeling.' He concedes that in adhering to this definition *we are re! dnced to the alternative of believing that the mind, or...any series of feelings or possibilities of them, or else of accepting the paradox that something which, ex hypothesi, is bnt a series of feelings can be...

...expressed in the words of J. 8. i Emotiont and Will, 3rd ed., " Consciousness," p. 584. Mill, viz., " the alternative of believing that the Mind or Ego,...from any series of feelings or possibilities of them ". To admit this, of course, is to admit the necessity of distinguishing between Mind or Ego, meaning...

...by calling it a series of feelings which is aware of itself as past and future : and we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the Mind, or...is something different from any series of feelings, and possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox, that something which «j Itypotkesi is but...

...calling it . a scries of feelings which is aware of itself as past and future : and we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the Mind, or...is something different from any series of feelings, and possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox, that something which c,c hgpothesi is but a...

...future ; and we are reduced to " the alternative of believing that the mind, or Ego, is some" thing different from any series of feelings or possibilities...or of accepting the paradox that something which, " ex hypothesi, is but a series of feelings can be aware of itself " as a series."* Nothing could be...

...feelings or possibilities of " them, or of accepting the paradox that something which, " ex hypothesi, is but a series of feelings can be aware of itself " as a series."* Nothing could be fairer or braver than this statement by Mr. Mill of the intrinsic objection to his...

...definition of mind as " a series of feelings " must be abandoned. and the mind must be thought of as " something different from any series of feelings or possibilities of them," or the paradox must be maintained that " that which, ex hypothesi, is but a series of feelings can be...

...by calling it a series of feelings which js aware of itself as past and future ; and we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the mind, or...them, or of accepting the paradox that something which ex hypotheses is but a series of feelings can be aware of itself as a series." At this point John S....

...account for the origin of the notion of a world not identified with sensation f 8. " The paradox that a series of feelings can be aware of itself as a series." This statement disguises the actual difficulty involved ? Show that the difficulty is essentially different...

...feelings, or possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox that something which, ex hypothesi, is but a series of feelings, can be aware of itself as a series.'—Exam. 3d ed. p. 242. Which alternative is commonly accepted, there can be no doubt. But...